Sino-Japanese War - Paine

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy by S.C.M. Paine - 5/5

Paine's history of the Sino-Japanese war is a well argued, clearly written account of what she terms "a seminal event in world history." Paine is able to put this event into the context of its time and shows the clear impact this conflict had on subsequent events and perceptions in the world. Her detailed descriptions of the events are largely derived from daily newspapers that were reporting on events as they unfolded. The book is heavily footnoted showing Paine's commendable effort in developing an objective and accurate narrative.

The book is separated into three clear sections. The first section covers the pre-war period and looks at events China, Korea, Japan and Russia that led to the conflict. Paine draws a distinction between the former two and the latter two arguing that while Japan and Russia were modernizers, China and Korea were corrupt, ineffectively run states that were generally antagonistic towards foreign influence and modernization in general. Paine shows clearly that Manchu's at the time feared the rise in strength of any Han dominated military force as they feared the Han Chinese would want to overthrow them and therefore never developed a strong national defensive structure. This, along with the general level of corruption and disorganization contributed to Chinese weakness in the face of a modern Japanese military. Paine also spends time describing the politics and the intrigues of in Korea and the difficulties the Japanese had in encouraging Korea to modernize against the wishes of China, their "protector".

Paine also explores the modernization in Japan (Meiji Restoration) at the time and also looks at Russia and the collective expansionist goals both countries had. Paine argues that the Sino-Japanese war was instigated by the Japanese to prevent growing Russian influence in East Asia. The announcement of the development of the trans-Siberian railway line was in fact the catalyst for the war. Paine shows without doubt the Japanese were the aggressors and argues successfully that they were increasingly interested in empire building too.

The second section goes into some detail on the four major battles (and some minor ones) of the Sino-Japanese war: The Battle for Pyonyang, the Battle of Yalu River, the Battle of Port Arthur and the Battle of Weihaiwei. Paine looks at the reasons for the rapid Japanese success and argues the best strategy for the Chinese to have employed was to attack the Japanese troop carriers at seas. Manchu military orders also prevented the Chinese from destroying military supplies and thereby, when they retreated, left supplies for the Japanese to consume. Paine argues the Japanese logistic lines were severely stretched and if the Chinese had not been so generous the Japanese would have had more difficulties in resupplying their front line forces. Throughout the progress of the battles Paine is careful to follow the diplomatic discourse in each country and also notes the rising strength of the Japanese military over their diplomatic corp. Paine is also quick to show how Japan wanted to show their best to the foreign powers and were quick to assimilate criticisms of their behavior.

The final section focuses on the consequences of the war (both long term and short term). Of course the Treaty of Shimoneski and the triple intervention by France, Russia and Germany gets significant coverage, but Paine also makes a concerted effort to show the effect the war had on events in the 20th century. Paine's main contention is that the war altered the balance of power in the east and the perception of both foreigners, China and Japan. For example Paine argues that Japan did not win her wars against Japan and Russia, rather, Paine argues, Japan and Russia lost their respective wars. Paine argues this created the wrong perceptions in Japan and gave them self-belief to attack America in 1941. Paine also notes that this war was the beginning of Korea's "20th century nightmare" and marks the rise of Japan as the first successful developing nation.

Paine makes a concerted (and much appreciated) effort to understanding the cultural underpinnings of the main protagonists. She dedicates a whole chapter at the end to the underlying culture of both the Chinese and the Japanese and contrasts this with Western culture to try to help readers understand why foreigners at the time simply did not grasp the cultural undercurrents that were being played out. Not only that, she explores the distinctions between Japanese and Chinese culture, which although have some similarities, are worlds apart in other ways. Throughout the book Paine constantly refers to the shadow games of keeping and losing "face" and takes the time to explain why the foreigners did not fully perceive what was going on.

There is much too commend this book. The detail and depth of Paine's understanding is commendable as is her compassion for some of the main protagonists such as China's military leader in the war Li Hong Zhang (who is heavily criticized despite being the only one in China to understand the need of the Chinese to modernize). Paine's book is a good starting point for any study of 20th century East Asian history. The Sino-Japanese war led to the rise of Japan, the fall of Manchu dynasty, conflict between Russia and Japan, the eventual second Sino-Japanese war and the split of Korea and the Taiwan question. The massacre of Port Arthur was also a tragic harbinger of what was to come four decades later in Nanking. As someone who has lived in Taiwan and East Asia for more than a decade, I really enjoyed and appreciated this book as it sheds light on many of today's pressing questions.